Civil War Peace Agreements

Between late 1997 and early 2000, Stanford University`s Centre for International Cooperation in Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the International Peace Academy (IPA) conducted research to better understand the determinants of successful peace implementation. The CISAC IPA peace implementation project focused on three main themes: Ruggeri, A., Gizelis, T. I., Dorussen, H. (2013). Management of mistrust: an analysis of cooperation with UN peacekeeping in Africa. Resolution of the Journal of Conflict, 57(3), 387-409. Why did this happen? The central content of the agreement with respect to the management of the transitional regime remained unacceptable to the NPFL. As a result, the NPFL continued to undermine the peace agreement. Moreover, the agreement did not have an enforcer willing to enforce the rules by both the NPFL and the other belligerents. Often, a peace treaty is also not used to end a civil war, especially in the event of a failure of secession, because it involves mutual recognition of the state.

In cases such as the American Civil War, it usually ends when the army of losers surrenders and its government collapses. On the other hand, a successful secession or declaration of independence is often formalized by a peace treaty. Kirschner, Shanna, Trust and fear in civil wars: Ending intrastate conflicts (Lanham, Boulder, New York and London: Lexington Books, 2014). See peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html. The characteristics of the warring factions are crucial to the outcome of the peace agreements. Indeed, the attributes of the parties to the conflict and the conclusions that flow from them make it possible to understand the behaviour of the parties during the peace process. Among the main features are the agendas of the different parties and their strategies of persecution. One of the most important strategies is the spoiler (Stedman, 1997; Mutwol 2009). This role is assumed either by the refusal of the recalcitrant party to participate in a peace process or by its efforts to prevent the implementation of a peace agreement. In the end, the Conference elected a president and vice-president of the interim national unity government and an expanded interim legislature. Despite the constant intransigence of Taylor`s NPFL, the conference made further concessions to Taylor: 1) it transferred 40% of the seats of the NPFL`s legislative body; 2) reserved the spokesperson`s position for the NPFL; 3) seats allocated to Taylor NPFL`s Transitional Supreme Court; 4) agreed that Taylor would be the only senior transitional government official to run in the immediate presidential elections. Once again, Taylor rejected the offers and maintained that he should be both the president of the transitional government and a candidate in the next election.

This was because the agreement did not meet the NPFL`s central request. On the basis of the appeasement model that ECOWAS had adopted as the core of its pacifying architecture, Taylor knew that the NPFL would not be obliged to abide by the terms of the agreement. Given the continuing division between Burkina Faso and Côte d`Ivoire, which supported Taylor`s NPFL, and other members of the organization who did not want to accept Taylor`s main request that he be appointed head of the transitional regime and that the Liberian presidency could then run in the next elections, the NPFL knew that the terms of the agreement would not be enforced.

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